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Abstract
In this paper, we examine network capital usage and migration patterns in a theoretical model.
Networks are modeled as impacting the migration decision in many ways. When young, larger
networks reduce the time lost moving from one region to another. In addition networks decrease
the time spent searching for a job. Finally, when old, migrants receive transfer payments through
the network. We show that the number and properties of steady state equilibria as well as the
global dynamics depend crucially on whether the returns to network capital accumulation exhibit
constant, increasing, or decreasing returns to scales relative to the level of network capital. With
constant returns to scale, migration flows and network capital levels are characterized by either
a unique steady state equilibria or by a two-period cycle. The fluctuations in network capital
usage exhibited by our model are consistent with recent empirical data regarding the usage of
networks by Mexican immigrants. In the case of increasing returns to scale, either there exists a
unique, stable steady state equilibria or multiple equilibria which are characterized as either sinks
or saddles. When the returns to scale are decreasing, there exists a unique, stable steady state
equilibrium. Finally, we show that increasing barriers to migration will result in an increase in the
flow of immigrants, contrary to the desired eﬀect, in the constant and increasing returns to scale
cases.
1 Introduction
Although many factors influence an individual’s decision to migrate, economists have increasingly
focused on the important role played by social networks.1 As Massey et al. (1987) discuss, these
networks play a crucial role, as potential migrants rely on social networks for information regard-
ing issues such as migration routes, employment opportunities, housing, etc. Over the past two
decades there has been a considerable amount of empirical work by Massey and many others (and
some theoretical work) exploring in greater detail the interrelationships among networks, migration
decisions, border deterrence, and other factors.2
However, these works are predicated on the assumption that network usage is increasing over
time. Most recently Fussell and Massey (2004) present evidence that suggests that the importance
of networks has changed and that network usage may wax and wane. Consequently, the existing
theoretical literature on networks is not well suited to account for changes in network importance
over time. The narrative approach that motivates much of the current theoretical line of inquiry
focuses chiefly on social networks. In this approach, the stock of migrants already in the new region
is the social network. Carrington et al. (1996) develop a model in which network capital is a perfect
complement to the number of existing migrants, which never decreases.
Perfect complementarity, however, precludes an examination in which network capital takes
other forms. We take an alternative approach, modeling network capital accumulation as an in-
vestment. Although this investment is related to the volume of migrants, it also takes into account
the possibility that migrants may choose the quantity of resources to invest in maintaining and
improving network infrastructure. Our approach lends itself to a richer dynamic structure that
includes both migration flows and network capital accumulation.3 Consequently, one of the ques-
tions we seek to address with this paper is under what conditions will cycles in network capital
usage and migration arise. In addition, we are interested in understanding how changes in barriers
1For some of the earlier works exploring factors, other than networks, aﬀecting migration, see Harris and Todaro
(1970), for rural-to-urban migration; Myrdal (1944) for international migration; and Grubel and Scott (1966) and
Berry and Soligo (1969) for across country borders migration. Theses papers, and those which have followed, have
helped to shed light not only on migration issues, but also on issues such as development, income convergence, and
economic growth.
2For recent additional work on the importance of networks in the migration process see Munshi (2003), Massey
et al. (2002), Orrenius (2001), Helmenstein and Yegorov (2000), Massey et al. (1994), Massey (1987), and Massey
et al. (1987).
3This is in contrast to Carrington et al. (1996), where the stock of migrants is the only variable that moves through
time. Because migrants are infinitely lived and there is no return migration, it is equivalent to treat the stock of
migrants as embodying the accumulated network capital. We break this link, separating migration from network
capital and treating each as a decision variable.
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to migration, for example border patrols or people smugglers, aﬀect the propensity for potential
migrants to immigrate and their reliance on networks.
We build on the existing literature in three distinct ways. First, our approach encompasses
the notion of network capital forwarded by Carrington et al. (1996) and, more recently, in Colussi
(2003). The initial state of the network in any given period is dependent on the previous generation
of migrants. In addition however, we model network capital accumulation as a technology depen-
dent upon young migrants’ time and physical resources as inputs. Both current migrants eﬀorts
and the stock of (old) migrants and their other accumulated resources are important determinants
to developing and maintaining social networks, which reduce migration costs by providing informa-
tion about housing stock, transportation, knowledge of employment opportunities, etc. Thus, our
modeling of networks is general enough to encompass the concept of networks found in Colussi and
Carrington, et al., but at the same time network capital is not a perfect complement to the stock
of migrants.4
Second, we explicitly model the channels through which networks impact migration. More
specifically, we model networks as aﬀecting three distinct aspects of migration: the time spent
crossing the border, time spent finding a job after crossing the border, and the quantity of funds
remitted to elderly family members.5 With respect to remittances, network capital serves as an
alternative store of value, and thus as a means for executing intergenerational transfers. In short,
network capital lowers the cost of migrating when young and serves as a social safety net when old.
Third, we explicitly consider a role for a broad range of activities that aﬀect migration, which
we collectively refer to as barriers to migration. We think of these as any activities that impact the
costs of migration and examples would include government eﬀorts to deter migration, whether it
be from the home region or the host region, and people smugglers.6 In doing so, our aim is to have
a model that encompasses a broad range of migratory experiences, including country-to-country
4While we focus on migration in the context of cross-country moves, the model is general enough to address
intra-country migration. For instance, the Underground Railroad operated in the U.S. during the middle part of the
19th Century. The migration of blacks during this period would be aﬀected by the network of free blacks living in
the states that abolished slavery as well as the investment in building and maintaining the Underground Railroad.
Our model could potentially shed new light on flows of blacks from Slave states to Free states during that period.
5See Suro (2003) and Massey and Parrado (1994) for papers that examine the importance of remittances by
migrants.
6There is ample evidence that barriers to migration (both good and bad) exist. For example, with cross-country
migration there often times exist border patrols as well as people smugglers. Within a country examples of barriers
would include the eﬀorts of Southern states in the pre-Civil War United States to prevent slaves from escaping North
and the eﬀorts of the Underground Railroad to facilitate slave’s journey to freedom.
Although we allow for any number of barriers to migration, we do not explicitly model any particular one. See
Guzman et al. (2002) for an example of a cross-country migration paper where both people smugglers and government
border enforcement are explicitly modeled as profit maximizing and welfare maximizing agents respectively.
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and region-to-region.
In our model, network capital aﬀects the migrant’s decision via three channels. Specifically,
network capital serves to a) reduce the time spent crossing the border due to border crossing
frictions, b) reduce the time spent looking for a job due to job search frictions, and c) increase the
remittances received from young migrants when old. The accumulation of network capital when
young is aimed at reducing frictions for the next generation of migrants, so that their income from
host-region (the region to which individuals migrate) employment will be larger than it otherwise
would have been. The payoﬀ to today’s generation is that the larger tomorrow generation’s income,
the more they will remit back to today’s generation when old.
A migrant’s decision depends on both intratemporal and intertemporal factors. The intratem-
poral part reflects the migrant’s trade-oﬀ between dividing time in the home region (from which the
migrant is emigrating) and the host region. The intertemporal component captures the decision
over how to divide the migrant worker’s savings portfolio between a storage technology and network
capital maintenance and creation. The return to network capital comes in the form of an old-age
remittance. As such, network capital serves as the de facto means of executing intergenerational
transfers. Young migrants invest in network capital today, receiving a transfer payment from the
next generation of migrants. Meanwhile, the next generation of migrants is willing to participate
in this intergenerational transfer because they benefit from a larger stock of network capital in the
form of lower migration costs and because the next period’s young will also participate.7
The results of our paper are divided along two lines. First, we investigate the properties of the
dynamical equilibria in our model economy. We derive conditions under which there are cycles in
both migration flows and the levels of network capital, even though factor payments are constant
over time. What is crucial for our results is the scale return to network capital. More specifically,
we show that if the return to capital (via remittances) exhibits constant returns to scale in the level
of network capital, than equilibrium either consists of a unique steady state equilibria (similar to
Carrington et al. (1996)) or of a two-period cycle where both the levels of migration and network
capital fluctuate between a high and low state. Thus, in a simple dynamical model of migration we
can generate fluctuations akin to those currently being observed in the real world. Furthermore,
if the return to network capital exhibits increasing returns to scale, than either a unique, stable
steady state exists, or if multiple steady state equilibria exist, then some are sinks and others are
7Obviously, it is important that there is an infinite sequence of overlapping generations. There are similarities
between the participation in network capital and participation in monetary exchange in the overlapping generations
economies.
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saddles. These steady states have the property that the greater the level of network capital, the less
migration which occurs, and vice versa. Finally, if the return to network capital exhibits decreasing
returns to scale, then there exists a unique, stable steady state equilibrium. In both the increasing
and decreasing returns-to-scale cases, the sinks exhibit monotonic convergence.
Second, we examine the eﬀects that an increase in the barriers to migration would have on
the long-run values of migration and network capital. In the case of constant returns to scale, an
increase in the barriers to migration results in increased migration flows and larger networks. To
compensate for more time spent crossing the border and looking for jobs, migrants spend more
time migrating, which leads to an increase in host region wage income and counteracts the impact
of the stringent barriers. Increased migration also goes hand-in-hand with greater network capital
accumulation, which increases remittance income when old, again oﬀsetting the extra time next
generation must spend crossing the border due to increased barriers. A similar result holds in
the increasing returns case under certain restrictions. Finally, in the case of decreasing returns,
migration could either increase or decrease in response to an increase in the barriers to migration.
Interestingly, such barriers result in a larger long-run stock of network capital, which helps to
overcome the higher barriers eﬀect on border crossing and job search frictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environ-
ment while equilibrium and the laws of motion are characterized in section 3. In Section 4, we
derive the dynamic properties of the model economy while section 5 examines the comparative
statics for changes in policy parameters We provide a brief summary and conclusion in Section 6.
2 The Model
In our model economy, the physical environment consists of two regions: a home region, from which
individuals may choose to emigrate, and a host region, to which individuals immigrate and from
which there is no emigration.8 The economies of both regions are characterized by a standard
two-period lived, overlapping generations model with production. Time is discrete and indexed by
t = 0, 1, 2, ... In both regions, each generation is composed of a continuum of individuals having
unit mass.9 All individuals, regardless of their region of origin, are identical with respect to their
preferences and endowments; they are endowed with one unit of labor when young and nothing when
8Our model is generic in the sense that we consider any two distinct geographic regions. As such, one can view
these regions as within a given state or country and also as separate countries. Thus our model is able to encompass
rural-to-urban, interregional and cross country migration.
9There is no loss in generality by assuming that the population of the two regions is identical.
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old. Individuals derive utility only from old-age consumption. There is an initial old generation of
migrants, who reside in the host region and posses an initial stock of network capital a0.
Production in both regions is characterized by linear production technologies in which labor is
the sole input. It is assumed that individuals in both regions produce regionally homogenous final
goods that are not traded between regions. These goods are produced and saved in the individual’s
first period of life, and then consumed when old.10 Finally, we assume that final goods produced
in the home region are perfect substitutes for final goods produced in the host region. As such, the
no-trade assumption is not as constraining as might first appear.
2.1 Home Region
All individuals born in the home region are potential migrants. Each generation of migrants is
endowed with one unit of labor when young and nothing when old. Since only old-age consumption
is valued, this labor is supplied inelastically when young. The migrant must decide what fraction
of her labor time, µt, to spend working in the home region and what fraction, 1 − µt, to spend
outside the home region. For simplicity, we refer to the time spent outside the home-region, 1−µt,
as migration. The time spent migrating is further divided between three activities: crossing the
border, looking for work, and working in the host-region.
The acts of crossing the border and looking for work are time consuming because there exist
frictions such as escaping home-region migration restrictions, avoiding host-region border patrols,
applying for work permits, looking for work, etc. We let 1− ξ (·) denote the fraction of non-home
region time spent actually crossing the border, and thus, ξ (·) , is the fraction of migration time
spent both looking for work and actually working in the host region. Once a migrant successfully
reaches the host region, they spend 1 − p (·) of their remaining time searching for a job and the
remainder of their time, p (·), actually working. Thus, the actual amount of time spent working
and earning wage income in the host region is given by ξ (·) p (·) (1− µt).
The fraction of migration time spent looking for work and working, ξ (at−1, θ) , is assumed to
depend both on barriers to migration, θ, and on the level of the network to which the migrant has
access, at−1.11 As the frictions impeding the flow of migrants across regions decline, the fraction
10Although a linear, labor-only production function may be simplistic, often times migrants (for example illegal
immigrants crossing from Mexico to the United States) are not highly skilled and consequently are employed in low
skilled jobs subject to minimum wage requirements. In addition, this simplification allows us to focus specifically on
the impact of networks on migration flows — abstracting from other factors which aﬀect migrant’s decisions.
11While not explicitly modeling the types and natures of potential barriers, we let θ denote the parameter that
serves as a proxy for the level of border frictions enacted between the two regions. See Guzman et al. (2002) and
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of time spent in the host region increases. Thus, a greater level of network capital reduce the
time spent crossing the border while increased resources devoted to erecting barriers to migration
increases the time spent crossing the border, i.e., ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 < 0. In addition, we assume that
regardless of the level of either network capital or barriers, ξ (at−1, θ) > 0 for all values of at−1 ≥ 0
and θ ≥ 0. Since ξ (at−1, θ) is the fraction of migration time spent in the host region, it must also
be the case that ξ (at−1, θ) ≤ 1. Also, if no resources are devoted to erecting barriers, then there
is no loss of time from crossing the border: ξ (at−1, 0) = 1. Finally, for simplicity, we assume that
0 ≤ at ≤ 1 for all t.
Once the migrant successfully migrates to the host region, she must spend some time searching
for a job. The amount of time spent searching, 1 − p (at−1), will depend on the extent of the
network to which she has access. The time lost searching for work is positively related to the stock
of network capital; that is, p0 (at−1) > 0 and we also assume that when the value of network capital
equals one, then p (1) = 1.12
Although the breakdown of the time spent working in the host region into three distinct parts
((1− µt) , ξ (at−1, θ) , and p (at−1)) may seem cumbersome, it permits a more explicit approach
in terms of the channels through which network capital aﬀects time spent away from the home
region. More specifically, we are able to isolate the role that networks play in two very important,
but distinct, aspects of any migration: crossing borders and finding a job. In addition, our set-up
also allows us to better understand the benefits and limitations of networks vis-a-vis barriers to
migration.
Migrants who work in the home region earn a fixed wage w per unit of time spent in home-region
production.13 All income earned in the home region is saved via a simple storage technology. For
every unit of output saved at time t, the migrant receives x units of consumption good at date
t + 1 for all t ≥ 1. Migrants who successfully cross between regions and find work in the host
region earn a fixed wage, w∗, per unit of time spent working. Income received in the host region is
divided among three distinct items. First, migrants decide how much of their income to spend on
Guzman et al. (2003) for two papers where border frictions are explicitly modeled. Both of these papers allow for
border enforcement initiated by the government of the host region and a home-region smuggling industry designed
to circumvent enforcement. We abstract from the issued presented in those papers in order to focus explicitly on the
role that networks play influencing migrant’s decisions.
Finally, we think of the contribution of network capital as consisting of such things as communicating information
regarding crossing points, border enforcement and smuggler eﬃcacy.
12An example of this might be the case where a suﬃcient network exists such that previous migrants own businesses
in which the new migrants can immediately begin working.
13Alternatively, one can think of ω as an endowment which the migrant receives continuously throughout his young
period life. Thus, if the migrant choose to stay in the home country for µ fraction of his young life, then she will
receive only ωµ of the total endowment possible.
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continuing and improving the network capital which helped them to migrate. Second, they remit
part of their host-region income back to the old generation. Third, migrants save any remaining
income via the host region’s storage technology. For every unit of host region output saved at time
t, the migrant receives y units of consumption good at date t+ 1 for all t ≥ 1.14
We let α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, denote the fraction of host region income which is remitted to the
migrant’s parents. We define Nt as the quantity of resources devoted to maintaining and updating
the migrant network. The evolution of the stock of network capital is given by
at = (1− µt)
µ
at−1 +
Nt
(1− α)w∗
¶
. (1)
Thus, the stock of network capital depends on two factors: the previous stock plus any new invest-
ment. In addition the more time spent migrating, the larger the quantity of network capital. The
rationale for this specification takes into account the generational investment. Unlike Carrington
et al. (1996), in which agents are infinitely lived, the generational friction we introduce explicitly
takes into account the endogenous depreciation of networks that is tied to the flow of young mi-
grants. So, networks can vanish if members of one generation do not migrate. As such, network
capital depends on each generation investing and maintaining the stock. There is a form of endoge-
nous depreciation, reflecting each generation’s decision. Moreover, we distinguish between network
capital as an entity that is distinguishable from the stock of existing (old) migrants living in the
host region. This modeling choice has two noteworthy implications. First, under general conditions
we have planar as opposed to a scalar dynamic system. Second, it permits network capital to be
the means of intergenerational transfers for migrants.
We can formally write the migrant’s problem as
max
µt,Nt
U (ct+1) (Migrant’s Problem)
subject to
st = µtw + [(1− µt) ξ (at−1, θ) p (at−1) (1− α)w∗ −Nt] (2)
14Remittances to family members play an important role in cross country migration, for example. It is not
uncommon for illegal Mexican migrants to come to the US, work in the US for a period of time and send most of the
income earned back to relatives and family in Mexico.
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and
ct+1 = xµtw + y [(1− µt) ξ (at−1, θ) p (at−1) (1− α)w∗ −Nt] (3)
+α
¡
1− µt+1
¢
ξ (at, θ) p (at)w∗
Equation (2) characterizes the saving by an agent born at date t ≥ 1. The first term is the
wages earned in the home region, which is simply the product of time spent working in that region,
µ, and the wage rate, w. The second the term captures host-country income net of remittances
and investment in network capital. Equation (3) represents the quantity of goods available for old-
age consumption, including the returns to savings when young – the first two terms on the right
hand side of the equation – and remittances received from date-t + 1 migrants. We assume that
U (ct+1) satisfies all the standard conditions necessary for an interior solution; namely U (0) = 0
and U 0 (ct+1) > 0.
The solution to the migrant’s maximization problem is characterized by the following two equa-
tions:
xw = y (1− α)w∗
µ
ξ (at−1, θ) p (at−1) +
at
(1− µt)2
¶
(4)
y (1− α)
1− µt
= α
¡
1− µt+1
¢ £
ξ1 (at, θ) p (at) + ξ (at, θ) p
0 (at)
¤
(5)
Equation (4) is an intratemporal eﬃciency condition. For a utility maximizing individual, income
from spending an additional unit of time in the home region must be equal to the additional income
(net of remittances and network contributions) generated from spending additional time in the host
region. Equation (5) is an intertemporal eﬃciency condition and represents the arbitrage condition
between the two forms of old-age saving: storage and networks. The left-hand side of this equation
represents the old-age income lost by investing an additional unit in network capital as opposed
to storage. The right-hand side is the marginal income gained from an additional unit of network
capital investment, where the return to network investment takes the form of remittances from the
next generation.
2.2 Host Region
The utility maximization problem faced by individuals born in the host region is trivial. Because
these individuals do not migrate and because we do not allow for the trade of goods across borders,
they simply work in the host region, save any income earned, and consume the proceeds from their
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host region storage technology savings. As mentioned previously, the production technology in the
host region is labor only and also linear in labor inputs. Thus, the host region native’s maximization
problem is given by
max
c∗t+1
U
¡
c∗t+1
¢
(Host Problem)
subject to
c∗t+1 = yw
∗.
This setup greatly simplifies our equilibrium analysis and allows us to focus on the role of networks
in determining the migration dynamics of home region individuals.
3 Equilibrium Laws of Motion
Equilibrium requires that individuals in both regions make optimal choices and that the goods
markets in both regions clear. Thus a competitive equilibrium for the economy must satisfy the
following
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium consists of a sequence of levels of migration, {µt}∞t=1 ,
network capital stocks, {at}∞t=1 , and prices, {w,w∗, x, y}∞t=1 such that consumers satisfy (Migrant’s
Problem) and (Host Problem) and goods markets clear in both the home and host regions.
For the remainder of our analysis, we employ the following functional forms to capture the
border crossing frictions
ξ (at−1, θ) = azt−1 (1− θ) ,
and job search frictions
p (at−1) = azt−1,
where z > 0.15 We further assume that the policy parameter, θ, lies in the unit interval. Although
these functional forms are specific, what will be important later when discussing the dynamical
properties of steady state equilibria is our ability to characterize the product, ξ (at−1, θ) p (at−1)
(henceforth referred to as the return to network capital), as exhibiting either constant, increasing,
or decreasing returns to scale with respect to the existing stock of network capital.
15Although technically the border crossing and job search frictions are denote by 1− ξ (at−1, θ) and 1− p (at−1),
respectively, we will slightly abuse the terminology and refer to ξ (at−1, θ) as the border crossing frictions and p (at−1)
as the job search frictions.
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After substituting these functional forms into the equilibrium conditions (4) and (5), one obtains
xw = y (1− α)w∗
∙
a2zt−1 (1− θ) +
at
(1− µt)2
¸
(6)
and
y (1− α)
1− µt
= α
¡
1− µt+1
¢
2za2z−1t (1− θ) . (7)
Equations (6) and (7) serve as the basis for our analysis of migration dynamics. These equations
represent a simple system of two, nonlinear diﬀerence equations in two unknowns, namely the level
of migration flows, µt, and the level of network capital, at. When equating the marginal income
gains from working in the two regions, equation (6), it is obvious that there is an inverse relationship
between building network capital and spending additional time working in the host region, all other
things equal.
When equating the cost of additional network capital with the benefits, equation (7), the rela-
tionship between building network capital and in which region to spend time depends on whether
the return to network capital, ξ (at, θ) p (at) , exhibits constant, increasing, or decreasing returns
to scale with respect to the existing stock of network capital, at. Of particular interest will be the
case when the return to network capital exhibits constant return to scale, i.e. z = 1/2. In this case,
equation (7) completely describes the migration flows over time and is independent of the level of
network capital. In other words, an additional unit of income invested in the network yields future
remittances that are invariant to the size of the network capital stock. The complete dynamics for
all returns to scale for both the network capital stock and migration flows are described in the next
section.
4 Dynamic Equilibria
To ascertain the existence, number, and dynamical properties of any steady state equilibria, it will
necessary to know certain properties about the two equilibrium laws of motion, equations (6) and
(7). We begin by examining the case where the return to network capital exhibits constant returns
to scale.
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4.1 Constant Returns Case
When ξ (at, θ) p (at) exhibits constant returns to scale in at,equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten
as
xw
y (1− α)w∗ = at−1 (1− θ) +
at
(1− µt)2
(8)
and
y (1− α)
1− µt
= α
¡
1− µt+1
¢
(1− θ) . (9)
Note from equation (9) that the evolution of migrant flows over time is invariant to the level of, or
changes in, network capital.16 Thus, the two equations can be solved recursively by first solving
equation (9) for {µt}∞t=1 and plugging these values into equation (8) to ascertain the equilibrium
path for {at}∞t=1.
Rearranging equation (9), one obtains
µt+1 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
1
1− µt
(10)
In order for equilibrium to exists, it must be the case that there exists some values of µt that satisfy
the constraint 0 ≤ µt ≤ 1. The following assumption guarantees that this indeed is the case.
Assumption 1 : There exists parameter values for α, θ, and y, such that 0 < y (1− α) < α (1− θ).
This assumption is a necessary condition to ensure that 0 < µt < 1 for all t ≥ 1. More specifically,
if the ratio equals zero, migrants will spend all their time in the home region. In contrast, if the
ratio equals one, the migrant will spent all their time in the host region.
Note that the equilibrium law of motion for migration, equation (10), depends on the initial value
of migration, which is indeterminate in our model. Thus, the local dynamics governing migration
are path dependent. In order to describe the possibilities regarding the dynamic evolution of
migration, it will be useful to first describe the steady state equilibrium. Let µt = µt+1 = µ
SS,
then the steady state value of migration is given by
µSS = 1−
∙
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
¸ 1
2
.
As a result of Assumption 1, µSS lies within the unit circle. Furthermore, diﬀerentiating equation
16Recall that whenever we use the term migration or migration flows we are referring to the value of 1− µt.
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(10) yields
dµt+1
dµt
= −y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
1
(1− µt)2
< 0.
In addition, it is straight forward to verify that d2µt+1
±
dµ2t < 0 and the points where equation (10)
intersect the horizontal- and vertical-axes are the same and lie within the unit circle. Hence, equa-
tion (10) represents a downward sloping curve as depicted in Figure 1. The following proposition
characterizes the steady state and the dynamics of the system.
Proposition 1 For z = 1/2 and µ0 ≤ y (1− α) /α (1− θ) there exists three possible equilibria: a
unique steady state equilibria,
µ∗ = µSS,
and a two-period cycle where
µ∗1 = µ1
µ∗2 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
µ
1
1− µ1
¶
.
The proof of this lemma also follows from simply evaluating the derivative of equation (10) at
the steady state. In the constant-returns case,
dµt+1
dµt
¯¯¯¯
µSS
= −1
and thus equation (10) is symmetric about the 45◦ line. Consequently, for an initial value of µ1
such that
µ1 6= 1−
∙
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
¸ 1
2
,
equilibrium consists of a two period cycle. Finally, it must also be the case that µ1 ≤ y (1− α) /α (1− θ) .
For an initial level of migration such that
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) < µ1 ≤ 1,
then the desired levels of migration for all subsequent periods would be greater than one, a condition
not consistent with endowment constraints and thus the existence of equilibrium.
Given the recursive nature of the equilibrium laws of motion (8) and (9), we can now characterize
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the network capital dynamics, using the results of Proposition 1. Equation (8) can be rewritten as
at =
∙
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − at−1 (1− θ)
¸
(1− µ∗t )2 . (11)
In order for this equation to be well defined, it is necessary for 0 ≤ at ≤ 1. The following assumption
guarantees this restriction.
Assumption 2 There exists parameter values for α, x, y, w, w∗, and θ, such that
yw∗ (1− α) (1− θ) ≤ xw ≤ yw∗ (1− α) .
Diﬀerentiating equation (11) yields
dat
dat−1
= − (1− θ) (1− µ∗t )2 < 0.
Thus equation (11) represents as a downward sloping straight line (with slope greater than minus
one) and the steady state value of the network capital stock is given by
aSS (µ∗t ) =
xw
y(1−α)w∗ (1− µ∗t )
2
1 + (1− θ) (1− µ∗t )2
. (12)
Note that the number of steady states will depend on whether the equilibrium value(s) of migration
are either a unique equilibrium or represented by a two-period cycle. When the equilibrium level of
migration is given by µ∗ = µSS , then equation (11) is as depicted in Figure 2. When the equilibrium
level of migration is given by the two-period cycle
µ∗1 = µ1
µ∗2 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
µ
1
1− µ1
¶
,
then equation (11) is represented by two separate lines, as shown in Figure 3 (one for each value of
µ∗) and the level of network capital alternates between points on each line. More formally, network
capital equilibria and their dynamics are as follows.
Proposition 2 For z = 1/2 ,
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i) if µ∗ = µSS , then for any initial level of network capital, a0, network capital converges to
a∗ = aSS
¡
µSS
¢
,
and the dynamics are described by damped oscillations.
ii) if equilibrium migration is given by the two-period cycle
µ∗1 = µ1
µ∗2 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
µ
1
1− µ1
¶
,
then for any initial level of network capital, a0, network capital converges to a two-period cycle
a∗1 = a
SS (µ∗1)
a∗2 = a
SS (µ∗2) .
The dynamics in this case are also described by damped oscillations.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from two facts. First, the slope of equation (11) satisfies
0 > − (1− θ) (1− µ∗t )2 > −1. Since the slope is negative the dynamics will be characterized by
oscillations and since the slope is greater than −1, those oscillations will be damped. Thus for any
initial value, a0, network capital will converge to one of the steady state values. Second, the fact
that network capital converges either to a unique steady state or converges to a two-period cycle
stems from the fact that the return to network capital per migrant is independent of the existing
stock of network capital. Thus the only thing that aﬀects the old-age remittance payments is the
flow of migrants.
Remark: If the return to network capital accumulation exhibits constant returns to scale, then the
remittances received by individuals when old is also invariant to movements in the stock of network
capital. The implication is that the (intratemporal) migration decision does not depend on the
(intertemporal) savings decision, as both the rate of return on storage and on network capital are
fixed. Either migration flows will be constant over time (the steady state equilibrium) or they will
be cyclical (two-period cycle equilibria).
It is important to note that the two-period cycle is not the product of an underlying cycle in
wage diﬀerentials nor cycles in return diﬀerentials since both are constant over time in this model
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economy. Rather, the result owes chiefly to the fact that a given level of network capital can
be achieved either by increasing the fraction of productive time spent in the host country or by
increasing the investment in network capital per young migrant. Note that both are not required
since an individual’s time and resource investment are substitutes in the network creation process.
Consequently, for a given level of network capital investment, Nt, an increase in time spent away
from the home region will result in greater network capital.
The intuition regarding the potentially cyclical nature of migration comes straight from the
arbitrage condition, equation (9), and specifically how the flow of migration must evolve over time
so as to equate the returns to storage and network capital.17 With an increase in the fraction of time
migrating, for example, the quantity of network capital increases and, at the margin, increases the
return to network capital at a linear rate tied to the additional time spent migrating. Ultimately
however, the total return to network capital is measured in terms of remittances received when old.
This, in turn, depends on both the extent of the network built up when young and the extent to
which the next generation takes advantage of this network, i.e., whether they make use of it by
migrating or not.
It is now possible to illustrate how the two-period cycle can occur in this optimizing model. At
date-t, young migrants ascertain the best way to save for old age: either saving via wage income
invested in a storage technology or via network capital accumulation. For both assets, accumulation
depends on time spent migrating and network capital carried over from the previous generation. In
addition, time spent migrating and the beginning-of-period stock of network capital are substitutes
with respect to generating wage income and accumulating network capital. Consequently, if date-
t−1migrants spent a considerable time migrating, and thus built up a large stock of network capital
during the previous period, young migrants at date-t will choose to spend less time migrating. In
other words, a young migrant can achieve a given host-region income when young either by spending
a larger fraction of her time migrating, or by having a suﬃciently large network to overcome the
border crossing and job search frictions. Both are not necessary. Similarly, to maintain and build a
given size network for next period (and hence a given level of remittances when old), either a large
base of network capital is needed or a high level of migration. Again, both are not needed. Thus,
the cyclical nature of the equilibria owes to the fact that migration time and the level of network
capital with which one begins her life are substitutes in a migrant’s decision making process while
17As will be seen in the increasing and decreasing returns to network capital cases, the migration flows over time
will not depend solely on equating rates of return over saving options.
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migration time and the future level of the network capital stock are complements. Hence, both the
time spent migrating and the level of network capital will synchronously fluctuate over time.
Recently, Fussell and Massey (2004) presented evidence suggesting that the importance of, and
reliance on, networks by illegal immigrants from Mexico has declined slightly. When the return to
network capital exhibits constant returns to scale, our model economy can account for this finding;
indeed, the two-period cycle of our model predicts that from one generation to the next, we will
observe switches from high to low levels of network capital usage. Although there does not exist
suﬃcient data to assert that in the real world network capital formation exhibits a cyclical tendency
at generational frequencies, it is noteworthy that our model economy exhibits cyclical properties
based on the returns to scale to network capital. Because of the preliminary nature of the evidence,
we proceed by considering cases in which there are increasing and decreasing returns to scale in
returns to network capital.
4.2 Increasing Returns Case
When the return to network capital, ξ (at, θ) p (at) , exhibits increasing returns to scale, i.e., z >
1 /2 , then the system of equilibrium laws of motion is no longer recursive and determination of
equilibria will require equations (6) and (7) to be solved simultaneously. From equation (6), one
can obtain the loci of points for which network capital is unchanging over time, and evaluate this
loci in µt-at−1space.
Rewriting equation (6) one obtains
at − at−1 = 0 =
∙
xw
(1− α) yw∗ − a
2z
t−1 (1− θ)
¸
(1− µt)2 − at−1. (13)
In order for equation (13) to have a solution, it must be the case that
xw
(1− α) yw∗ ≥ a
2z
t−1 (1− θ)
for all parameter values and at−1 > 0. This condition simply requires that the marginal income
gained from spending additional time working in the home region must be greater than the marginal
wage income gained from additional time spent in the host region. Assumption 2 and the constraint
that at−1 ≤ 1 guarantee that this condition is satisfied.
We proceed by characterizing the loci of µt and at−1 that satisfy equation (13). Diﬀerentiating
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equation (13) yields
dat−1
dµt
h
(1− µt)2 2za2z−1t−1 (1− θ) + 1
i
= −2 (1− µt)
∙
xw
(1− α) yw∗ − a
2z
t−1 (1− θ)
¸
.
Given Assumption 2, the right-hand side of the above equation is always negative and the coeﬃcient
on dat−1 /dµt is always positive and thus dat−1 /dµt < 0. Hence, the locus of points at which
network capital is constant over time is downward sloping in µt-at−1 space (see Figure 4).
18 In
addition, it is easy to verify that when at−1 = 0, equation (13) intersects the horizontal axis at
the point µt = 1. Furthermore, when at−1 is held constant, then equation (13) indicates that an
increase in µt must be accompanied by a decrease in at. Thus, the phase dynamics are represented
by the arrows in Figure 4. Finally, note that nothing in the qualitative evaluation of equation (13)
depends on the parameter z. It follows that the characterization of the loci and the phase dynamics
apply to both the increasing returns case, when z > 1 /2 , and to the decreasing returns case, when
z < 1 /2 .
In contrast to the constant returns case, the second equilibrium law of motion, equation (7)
now depends on the stock of network capital. From equation (7), one can obtain the locus of points
that satisfy a constant level of migration overtime. Rewriting equation (7) and using equation (6)
yields the following equation
µt+1 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z−1 1(1− µt)4z−1 .
In order for this equation to be well-defined, it is necessary that 0 ≤ µt ≤ 1 for the given parameters.
The following assumption guarantees that there exist some values of migration flows that are inside
the unit circle.
Assumption 3 : For all 0 ≤ at−1 ≤ 1, there exists parameter values such that
0 <
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z−1 < 1.
This assumption is a necessary condition to ensure that 0 < µt < 1 for t ≥ 1. If the ratio equals
18For ease of exposition we have represented equation (13) as a straight line. However, d2at−1
?
dµ2t may be
positive or negative depending on the parameter values and the values of µt and at−1. Thus, this line may have
several “wiggles” in it. For the purpose of exposition and clarity, we represent equation (13) in all figures as being a
linear, downward sloping curve.
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zero, migrants will spend all their time in the home region.
The locus of points for which migration levels are unchanging over time is given by
µt+1 − µt = 0 = (1− µt)−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z−1 1(1− µt)4z−1 . (14)
As in the case where network capital was unchanging over time, we are particularly interested in
finding the slope of the loci of points that satisfy equation (14). Diﬀerentiating this equation with
respect to µt yields
dat−1
dµt
∙
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − a
2z
t−1 (1− θ)
¸2z−2
(2z − 1) (1− θ) za2z−1t−1 =
−y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
1
(1− µt)4z−1
.
The right-hand side of this equation is always negative. Given Assumption 2 and the fact that
z > 1 /2 , the coeﬃcient of the derivative on the left-hand side is always positive. Thus, dat−1 /dµt <
0 and equation (14) represents a downward sloping equation in µt-at−1 space. Furthermore, if
the return to network capital, ξ (at, θ) p (at) ,exhibits low- to moderate increasing returns, (i.e.,
1 /2 < z ≤ 1) then d2at−1
±
dµ2t < 0 and equation (14) has the convex shape depicted in Figure
5.19 In addition, equation (14) intersects the horizontal axis at the point
µt = 1−
⎛
⎜⎝ y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
³
xw
y(1−α)w∗
´2z−1
⎞
⎟⎠
1
4z
< 1. (15)
Finally, to characterize the phase dynamics associated with equation (14), consider the case
in which the value of µt is fixed. An increase in at−1 must be accompanied by a decrease in µt.
Thus the phase dynamics are represented by the arrows in Figure 5. The following proposition
characterizes steady state equilibria and the dynamics when there exist increasing returns to scale.
Proposition 3 For 1 /2 < z < 1, if there exists any steady state equilibria, then they have the
following properties:
i) if there exists a unique steady state equilibria, then it is a sink,
ii) if there exists two steady state equilibria, then high-migration one is a saddle and the low mi-
gration one is a sink.
19 If z > 1, then the sign of d2at−1
?
dµ2t will depend on the parameter values as well as the values of µt and at−1.
In this case it is likely that equation (14) will exhibit “wiggles.” However, for the purposes of this paper we focus on
the simple case of a convex equation.
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The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from the discussions of equations (13) and (14) above
and their respective phase diagrams; Figures 4 and 5.20 Combining these two figures into a single
phase diagram yields Figure 6 and 7. When there is a unique steady state equilibrium, as in Figure
6, then the steady state must be a sink. Note that if there is a unique equilibrium, then equation
(14) will always intersect equation (13) from above since equation (14) intersects the horizontal-axis
at a point µt < 1 whereas equation (13) intersects the horizontal-axis at the point µt = 1. When
there are two steady state equilibria, as in Figure 7, then the steady state with low migration (high
µ) and a low initial level of network capital will be a sink and the high-migration (low µ) and high
initial level of capital stock steady state will be a saddle point.
There are three key diﬀerences when comparing the increasing returns to scale case to the case
with constant returns to scale. First, and most obvious, remittances received when old are no
longer invariant to the level of network capital. Investments in network capital by today’s young
generation will have a larger impact in terms of reducing next generations’ border crossing and job
search frictions. To the extent that tomorrow’s young generation takes advantage of this network,
the payoﬀ in terms of remittances for network investment will be larger. Second, because the return
to network capital is a non-linear function of the level of network capital, the arbitrage condition can
be satisfied with a number of potential combinations of migration and network capital levels. Thus,
there exists the possibility for multiple (and greater than two) equilibria depending on parameter
values.21 Third, we find that the equilibrium dynamics are characterized by monotonic convergence
to either sinks or saddles. With increasing returns to scale, date-t migration and the beginning-
of-period level of network capital are no longer substitutes and date-t migration and end-of-period
network capital are not necessarily complements. However, in steady state, migration flows and
the level of network capital are complements.
4.3 Decreasing Returns Case
In the case where z < 1 /2 , the return to network capital exhibits decreasing returns to scale. Recall
from the analysis the intratemporal eﬃciency condition in the increasing returns case, equation (13),
20Recall that we are assuming that equation (13) is represented by a simple, linear downward sloping equation and
equation (14) by a convex, downward sloping curve. If we allow for more general forms of equations (13) and (14)
then whenever equation (14) intersects equation (13) from above, the resulting steady state will be a sink. Conversely
when equation (14) intersects equation (13) from below, the resulting steady state will be a saddle.
21On a more technical level, in the constant returns case, equation (10), evaluated in steady state, would be
a vertical line in µt-at−1 space. The result of the return to network capital exhibiting increasing returns is that
equation (14) becomes downward sloping. In addition, equation (11) is a straight line in the constant returns case
and the equivalent line in the increasing returns case, equation (13), may have more curvature and “wiggles.”
19
that neither the qualitative shape of the loci nor the phase dynamics depended on the value of z.
As such, the phase diagram depicted in Figure 4 still characterizes equation (13) in the decreasing
returns case.
Following the same methods developed in our analysis of the increasing returns case, we rewrite
equation (7), using equation (6) to obtain
µt+1 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z−1 1(1− µt)4z−1 .
The locus of points for which migration levels are unchanging over time is given by
µt+1 − µt = 0 = (1− µt)−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z−1 1(1− µt)4z−1 . (16)
Diﬀerentiation this equation with respect to µt yields
dat−1
dµt
∙
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − a
2z
t−1 (1− θ)
¸2z−2
(2z − 1) (1− θ) za2z−1t−1 =
−y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
1
(1− µt)4z−1
.
The right-hand side is always negative and, in contrast to the increasing returns case, the left-hand
side is now negative. Thus, with z < 1 /2 , the µt and at−1 that satisfy constant migration over
time results in a locus of points that is upward sloping in µt-at−1 space. The µ-intercept is given
by equation (15); however, the value of the intercept will change to reflect the change in the range
of z. Note that for the migration level to be in the unit circle, the following condition must hold:
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
³
xw
y(1−α)w∗
´2z−1 ≤ 1.
This will hold for some z < 1 /2 but not for arbitrarily small z. Let z¯ be defined by
z¯ =
y (1− α)
2α (1− θ) .
The following is a suﬃcient condition to guarantee that equation (15) is greater than zero.
Lemma 1 For all z such that
z¯ ≤ z < 1
2
,
the horizontal-intercept defined by equation (15) will lie between zero and one.
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Thus, equation (16) is represented by a upward sloping line, as depicted in Figure 8.22 Fur-
thermore, when µt is held constant, then equation (16) indicates that an increase in at−1 must
be accompanied by an increase in µt. Thus the phase dynamics are represented by the arrows in
Figure 9. The following proposition characterizes steady state equilibria and the global dynamics
in the decreasing returns case.
Proposition 4 For z¯ ≤ z < 1 /2 , there exists a unique steady state equilibria that is a sink.
The proof of Proposition 4 follows directly from the discussions of equations (13) and (16) above
and their respective phase diagrams. Figure 9 combines the diagrams from Figures 4 and 8. In
contrast to the increasing returns case, even if equation (16) and (13) are more “wavy,” there exists
a unique steady state equilibrium. Moreover, our results indicate that as long as the degree of
decreasing returns to network capital is not too great, the dynamics of migration flows and network
capital accumulation are characterized by a monotonic convergence to the steady state.
It is interesting to note that in the case where additional network capital decreases border
crossing and job search frictions, but at a decreasing rate, the locus of points for which migration
levels are unchanging over time is now upward sloping (as opposed to downward sloping in the
increasing returns case and vertical in the constant returns case.) Thus in the decreasing returns
case, the arbitrage condition can be satisfied in steady state migration levels only if migration and
the beginning-of-period network capital stock are substitutes — consistent with constant returns
case. In both cases, when migration and initial network capital stocks are substitutes, there exists
a unique steady state equilibria.
Remark: Overall, the dynamics of the economic system and the levels and properties of steady
state equilibria are intimately tied to the returns to scale exhibited by the returns to network capital
accumulation. In particular, constant returns to scale is unique in the sense that, in general,
the dynamics are characterized by two-period cycles where migration and network capital are
substitutes in the migrant’s decision. In contrast, convergence is monotonic in the cases in which
returns to scale are increasing or decreasing, although the numbers and properties of steady state
equilibria in these two cases will diﬀer. Thus, our analysis suggests that the specifics of how
networks are explicitly modeled (in our case networks alter the migration process by reducing both
22For ease of exposition we have represented equation (16) as a straight line. However, d2at−1
?
dµ2t may be
positive or negative depending on the parameter values and the values of µt and at−1. Thus, this line may have
several “wiggles” in it. For the purpose of expositional clarity, we depict equation (16) as being a linear, upward
sloping curve.
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border crossing and job search frictions, and this, in turn, aﬀects migrant’s decisions regarding time
and income allocations) are crucial to obtaining a better understanding of migration flows and the
role played by networks. In addition, by more explicitly modeling the role of networks in migrant’s
decision making process, we can better understand the impact of changes in policy parameters on
migrants flows, which we do in the following section.
5 Barriers to Migration
We now focus on the impact that changes in the barriers to migration would have on the dynamics in
our model economy and on the steady state values of migration and network capital accumulation.
Our aim is to shed light on how changes in the eﬀorts devoted to inhibiting (or fostering) migration
can have unexpected eﬀects. The parameter θ will be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
with the migration process under study. For instance, in the case of cross-country migration, one
can think of θ as encompassing both the level of border enforcement enacted by the host country
and also the levels of people smuggler activity intended to circumvent enforcement. Similarly, in
the case of the Underground Railroad in the mid-nineteenth century in the United States, it would
encompass both enforcement imposed by the home region (the South) as well as people smugglers
in the host region (the Underground Railroad). As with the analysis of the dynamics in section 4,
three cases are considered depending on whether the return to network capital exhibits constant,
increasing, or decreasing returns to scale.
5.1 Constant Returns Case
To ascertain the impact of an increases in the barriers to migration, it is suﬃcient to examine
equations (11) and (10),
at =
∙
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − at−1 (1− θ)
¸
(1− µt)2 (11)
and
µt+1 = 1−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ)
1
1− µt
. (10)
From equation (10), it is straightforward to show that dµt+1 /dθ < 0. As Figure 10 indicates, the
locus shifts toward the origin. While the characterization of equilibria remains unchanged (there
is either a unique steady state or a two-period cycle), the level of migration rises when compared
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against the equilibrium outcomes where migration barriers are lower. In particular, the steady
state value of migration is higher and, when equilibrium is characterized by a two-period cycle, the
level of migration in the second period (and every even number period thereafter) also rises. The
initial level of migration (and every odd period thereafter) is unchanged because it is chosen by
the migrant and assumed to be unchanged in our comparative statics exercise. Thus, increasing
barriers to entry has the undesired impact of actually increasing the number of migrants flowing
into the host region
The impact on the equilibrium value of network capital is similar to that of migration flows.
Diﬀerentiating equation (11) with respect to θ indicates that increases in barriers to migration
causes this equation to pivot up and become flatter, as depicted in Figure 11. For the case of a
unique steady state, we see that network capital increases in response to greater deterrence.23
The intuition for these results, both migration flows and network capital increase in response to
greater barriers to migration, is straightforward. Increasing the frictions aﬀecting border crossings
increase the time spent traversing from the home to host region. As a result, both host region
wage income and remittances received when old decline. To compensate, migrants spend more
time migrating, which leads to an increase in host region wage income and counteracts the impact
of greater deterrence. Increased migration also goes hand-in-hand with greater network capital
accumulation, which increases remittance income when old, again oﬀsetting the extra time next
generation must spend crossing the border due to increased barriers.
5.2 Increasing Returns Case
When z > 1/2, the following equations characterize the dynamic evolution of the economy:
at − at−1 = 0 =
∙
xw
(1− α) yw∗ − a
2z
t−1 (1− θ)
¸
(1− µt)2 − at−1, (13)
and
µt+1 − µt = 0 = (1− µt)−
y (1− α)
α (1− θ) 2z
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z−1 1(1− µt)4z−1 . (14)
As in the constant returns case, it is straightforward to verify from equation (13) that d (at − at−1) /dθ =
a2zt−1 (1− µt)
2 > 0. As Figure 12 shows, the locus pivots in a clockwise direction. Diﬀerentiating
23Although Figure 11 illustrates the case where there is a unique steady state value for the level of network capital,
the analysis naturally applies to the case where network capital converges to a two-period cycle.
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equation (14) with respect to the barriers to migration parameter yields
d
¡
µt+1 − µt
¢
dθ
=
−y (1− α)
α2z (1− µt)4z−1 (1− θ)2
h
xw
y(1−α)w∗ − a2zt−1 (1− θ)
i2z ∙ xwy (1− α)w∗ − 2za2zt−1 (1− θ)
¸
(17)
The sign of equation (17) is ambiguous, depending on whether the second term on the right-hand
side satisfies
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − 2za
2z
t−1 (1− θ) S 0.
For suﬃciently small z, i.e., z close to 1 /2 this expression will be positive, by Assumption 3. Thus,
if the return to network capital exhibits only mildly increasing returns, then equation (14) will shift
left, otherwise it will shift right. We concentrate our analysis on the low-migration steady state
because it is a sink.
If the degree of increasing returns are suﬃciently low, then as Figure 12 shows, an increase in
barriers to migration would be represented by a leftward shift in the locus corresponding to constant
migration and the steady state levels of both migration and network capital would increase. Because
the low-migration steady state is a sink, the economy would move to the new low-migration steady
state. The intuition for this increase in migration and network capital is the same as in the constant
returns case. Thus, the impact of greater deterrence would again be counterproductive; there is an
increase in migration.
In addition, if the return to network capital exhibited large enough increasing returns, than
equation (14) shifts right. The impact on the low-migration steady state is ambiguous, as depending
on the magnitudes of the shifts of equations (13) and (14) both the levels of migration and network
capital could increase or decrease. Finally, regardless of the exact impact on equilibrium values,
the economy will converge to the new low-migration steady state equilibrium.24
24At the high-migration steady state, if the degree of increasing returns was suﬃciently low, than new high-
migration steady state would be characterized by less migration and less network capital. However, the dynamics of
the system would not cause the economy to move from the old steady state to the new. In fact, the economy would
be on an unsustainable equilibrium path after the increase in barriers to migration.
Conversely, if the degree of increasing returns was suﬃciently high, then the levels of migration and network
capital at the new high-migration steady state would be ambiguous relative to the initial high-migration steady state.
However, the dynamical tendencies of the economy would move the economy towards the new low-migration steady
state, with less network capital and migration.
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5.3 Decreasing Returns Case
Then only diﬀerence between this case and the increasing returns case, is that when there is an
increase in deterrence, we can now sign d
¡
µt+1 − µt
¢
/dθ . Recall that the sign of d
¡
µt+1 − µt
¢
/dθ
depends on
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − 2za
2z
t−1 (1− θ) S 0.
However, in order for a problem to be well defined we know that
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − a
2z
t−1 (1− θ) > 0.
In addition, Assumption 2 guarantees that
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − (1− θ) > 0
Thus, since at−1 < 1 and when z < 1 /2 , then 2z < 1, it must be the case that
xw
y (1− α)w∗ − 2za
2z
t−1 (1− θ) > 0.
and hence d
¡
µt+1 − µt
¢
/dθ < 0. Figure 13 illustrates the respective shifts in equations (13) and
(14). As the figure shows, an increase in barriers to migration results in an increase in network
capital accumulation, but the eﬀect on the level of migration is indeterminate. Thus, the increase
in deterrence may, or may not, have the desired aﬀect of reducing migration flows. Greater barriers
reduce the marginal income from host country wage income. One way to maintain equality between
the constant marginal income in the home region and the marginal income of the host region is to
increase the level of network capital (see the intratemporal eﬃciency condition, equation (6)).
Remarks: Overall, we show that changes in barriers to migration have long-run eﬀects on migra-
tion and the size of network capital. Indeed, these eﬀects are surprises under certain versions of
the returns to network capital investment. The presence of network capital means that there is
another way in which migrants can aﬀect the returns to migrating. Our setup emphasizes the role
that returns to network capital plays along two specific dimensions: the allocation time between
home and host region and the allocation of savings between storage and network capital. Note sur-
prisingly, if the return to network capital is constant or increasing in the size of network capital, we
show that there is greater incentive to migrate. In part, the incentive stems from the direct return
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to network capital. Also, network capital is eﬀectively cheaper to accumulate when migration is
higher.
6 Conclusion
Social networks play an important role in facilitating migration, whether across borders or across
regions. However, recent empirical work suggests that the importance of networks to the migration
process may vary over time. Previous theoretical work is unable to accommodate these recent
findings as a result of the manner in which networks were modeled; namely networks were equivalent
to the stock of older migrants.
In this paper we break with these previous works and instead model networks as a combination
of the number of migrants and the physical resources they devote to maintaining and improving the
network. In addition we explicitly model network capital as being a factor which reduces the real
world frictions surrounding crossing borders and looking for employment. In our model economy,
the existing level of network capital aﬀects both a potential migrant’s migration decision (where
to spend her time) as well as her income allocation decision (by which means to save) and thus
migration flows and network capital are not one and the same, as with the previous literature.
We present two main sets results. First, we explore the global dynamics of the economy. We
show that when the costs of moving into the host region are linear in the stock of network capital,
the dynamical system is a recursive pair of nonlinear diﬀerence equations that, in general, can
exhibit two-period cycles. Thus, we are able to demonstrate in a simple model an economy where
the importance of networks will fluctuate over time. This fluctuation is the result of the fact that
migrants have two means for saving for old age: a storage technology and larger networks (which
result in greater old-age remittances). A given level of old-age income can be maintained either
through increased migration or via larger networks, but both are not simultaneously required.
We also explore cases in which the returns to network capital exhibit either increasing or decreas-
ing returns to scale. In the increasing returns case, there exists the possibility of multiple equilibria,
which are characterized as either sinks or saddles, while in the decreasing returns case there exists
a unique equilibrium. In both the increasing and decreasing cases, there exists monotonic conver-
gence to steady states and thus fluctuations, as observed in the constant returns case, are ruled
out.
Second, we study the eﬀect that changes in barriers to migration have on steady states. The
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long-run impact depends on the returns to network capital relative to the level of network capital.
In both the constant returns case and (the more relevant steady states of) the increasing returns
case, increasing the barriers to migration has the unintended consequence of actually raising the
quantity of migration. Increasing barriers makes crossing borders more diﬃcult and time consuming
and thereby reduces income and savings from working in the host region. One way for migrants
to overcome these declines in income is to devote greater time (more migration) and resources
(greater network capital) to the migration process. This suggests that governments that try to
restrict border crossings in places where networks play an important role in the migration process
may be instituting counterproductive policies.
There are several areas where our model can be fleshed out in greater detail in future work.
However, there are two primary areas for further consideration. The first would be to determine
the extent to which the functional forms for the returns to network capital could be generalized.
The second area for further refinement would be to make more explicit the various barriers to entry
which exist and their role in the migrant’s decision making process. Both of these refinements
would further our understanding of how migrants use and build networks aimed at enhancing the
migration process.
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Figure 1: Migration Flows in the Linear Case: An Unique Equilibrium or a Two-Period Cycle
Figure 2: Network Capital in the Linear Case: An Unique Steady State Equilibrium
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Figure 3: Network Capital in the Linear Case: A Two Period Cycle
Figure 4: Steady State Network Capital in the Convex Case
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Figure 5: Steady State Migration Flows in the Convex Case
Figure 6: Unique, Stable Steady State Equilibrium in the Convex Case
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Figure 7: Multiple Steady State Equilibria in the Convex Case
Figure 8: Steady State Migration Flows in the Concave Case
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Figure 9: Unique, Steady State Equilibrium in the Concave Case
Figure 10: Increased Barriers to Migration Increases Migration Flows
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Figure 11: Increased Barriers to Migration Raises the Level of Network Capital
Figure 12: Impact of an Increase in Barriers to Migration on Networks and Migration
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Figure 13: Increase in Barriers to Migration Raises Network Capital, but Impact on Migartion is
Ambiguous
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